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Hungarian Attempts at the Annexation 
of Slovakia in 1938      (Part I)
In my study, I tried to give an objective illustration of the diplomatic activity the Hungarian 
government carried on in order to get Upper Hungary from the beginning of 1938 to the 
first Viennese arbitration. My aim was not to do justice, instead, I intended to give a more 
tinged picture of the time by the revelation of events through Czech and Slovak sources. 
For the Hungarian government, rejecting the revision proposal of Hitler’s Germany apply-
ing for the whole of Slovakia, the only solution acceptable also for the four major European 
powers was the alternative of ethnic revision in 1938. Between the two world wars, the 
idea of acquiring Upper Hungary became the objective number one regarding Hungarian 
revision, engaging the attention of both the political and military circles. In 1938, it seemed 
to be possible that their aim might be realized.
In 1938, it was obvious that Czechoslovakia had become the ‘sick man’ of Europe. The Ger-
man-Czechoslovak crisis had deepened and war seemed to be at hand. Hungarian views 
concerning Czechoslovakia changed accordingly. Hungarian society and the government 
never approved of the loss of the northern region populated by Hungarians and Slovaks, 
just as they never accepted the loss of other territories of the former Kingdom of Hungary. 
They endeavoured to regain those territories during the interbellum years. The annexation 
of Slovakia was in the focus of Hungarian revisionary thought, cherished by both political 
and military circles.
Hungarian politicians especially resented the loss of Upper Hungary, second only to the 
loss of Transylvania, because this region had played an essential role in the economy of 
the Kingdom of Hungary. What is more, a part of the political elite had several links with 
the region due to their origins or former estates. Hungarian propaganda implied that since 
Czechoslovakia had no historical traditions as a state, it would be the easiest target to 
break up in order to regain the lost territories. In their view, Czechoslovakia was an artificial 
construction which could thank the great powers for its existence, and therefore could be 
defeated relatively easily in an appropriate moment.2
Hungarian government circles did not look at the birth of Czechoslovakia as the unification 
of the Slavonic population of Hungary with their mother country. They consistently denied 
that the Slovaks and the Czechs formed one nation. Thereby they denied the Czechoslovak 
2  The necessity of revision was self-evident for the Hungarian politicians and the public. They would not approve 
of the situation made by the Trianon Treaty. Miklós ZEIDLER, Magyar revizionizmus a két háború között, in: Limes 
14, 2001, 3, 10–11.
1 It is a novelty in my work that author used hitherto unknown Slovak and Czech sources, which provided a new 
approach to the events.
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state theory, which regarded the two ethnic groups as two branches of the same nation. 
For two decades, the Hungarian government endeavoured to prevent the Slovaks and the 
Czechs from establishing closer links. For them, the Slovaks were an ethnic group, which 
was subjugated by the Czechs and was, therefore, struggling for liberation together with 
other minorities. They held that the Slovaks formed an entirely separate nation in terms 
of ethnography, language and historical development. The Hungarian leadership shared 
the view that Slovakia, or at least the territories populated by Hungarians, had to return to 
Hungary. They believed that Slovaks and Ruthenians would vote for their unification with 
Hungary in a referendum. In order to popularise this idea, they secretly subsidized the 
Slovak movements led by František Jehlička3 and Viktor Dvorčák.4 The Hungarian govern-
ment set up the Slovak Central Bureau (Tót Központi Iroda) and the Slovak Department (Tót 
Főosztály) next to the Ministry of Nationalities. The aim of these institutions was to lead 
Slovakia, or a part of it, back to Hungary on certain conditions5. The Hungarian leadership, 
in order to have an influence on the Hungarian public as well, broadcast the propaganda 
in the 1930s that the Slovaks had already regretted not joining Hungary in 1918, and they 
wanted to redress their mistake, but they could not do it overtly in Czechoslovakia.6 Hun-
garian governments between the wars regarded gaining the support of the great powers 
of Europe to the idea of revision as their main task in foreign policy. Makers of Hungarian 
foreign policy did their best to lead their country out of her isolated position and to get 
allies for the territorial revision. Germany seemed to be the best supporter of this case.
Revision for the Hungarian government meant what they called ‘integral’ revision,7 that is, 
the retaking of all the land that had formed the Kingdom of Hungary. It was only in the sec-
ond half of the 1920s that ethnic revision8 was considered, and it was handled as a different 
solution.9 Integral revision was taken off the agenda of the Hungarian government as a plan 
without any real chance to be realised. Peaceful revision became a slogan from 1928.
By the mid1920s, the Hungarian governments had made it clear also for the leaders of the 
3  František Jehlička (Ferenc Jehlicska; 1879–1939), Slovak politician, Catholic priest and university professor. He 
was elected member of the Hungarian parliament in 1906 but he resigned from his seat shortly afterwards. He 
attended the Paris Peace Conference with Andrej Hlinka in 1919, where they wanted to speak up for Slovak au-
tonomy, but their plan did not work. From then on, he worked in service of the Hungarian government in several 
European cities, working on Slovak autonomy and the union of Slovakia and Hungary. For more about Jehlička 
see: Miroslav MICHEĽA, František Jehlička politikai pálfordulatai 1918–1920-ban, Pro Minoritate, 2005, 32–44; 
Marián HERTEL, František Jehlička. Nočná mora politického života, in: Do pamäti národa, Slavomír MICHÁLEK – 
Natália KRAJČOVIČOVÁ a kol., Bratislava 2003, 263–266.
4 Viktor Dvorčák (1878–1943) Slovak-born politician, formerly director of the archives in Sáros county. After Tri-
anon, he worked for the Hungarian government, under the pseudonym Szőke Költő (Blond Poet). Some sources 
also mention him as Dvorčák (Dvorcsák) Győző. He spread propaganda for the creation of an autonomous 
Slovak state within Hungary both in Hungary and abroad for decades. Miroslav MICHEĽA, Pod heslom integrity. 
Slovenská otázka v politike Maďarska 1918–1921, Bratislava 2009, 26–31. See Juraj KRAMER, Iredenta a separa-
tizmus v Slovenskej politike, Bratislava 1957, 18; Miroslav MICHEĽA, Maďarská politika a plány ozbrojenej akcie na 
Slovensku v rokoch 1919–1920, in: Vojenská História 12, 2008/2, 67.
5  Marián HRONSKÝ, Boj o Slovensko a Trianon 1918–1920, Bratislava 1988, 225–226.
6  Lajos STEIER, Felsőmagyarország és revízió, Budapest 1933, 32; István BORSODY, A magyar–szlovák kérdés 
alapvonalai, Budapest 1939, 37–38.
7  The notion of the restoration of the pre-Trianon Kingdom of Hungary.
8  The notion of regaining the Hungarian-populated areas.
9  László SZARKA, A kisebbségi kérdés a magyar–csehszlovák kapcsolatokban, in: Regio 1, 1990, 3, 236–237.
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Hungarian minorities that they considered territorial revision the only satisfactory solution.10 
Still, there were some in-between ideas as well: a possible referendum was mentioned, for 
instance, about the territory of Slovakia with the support of the great powers, but this could 
not get any serious consideration. Reunification and referendum, the plan of a common 
Hungarian-Slovak state remained among the plans of certain Hungarian politicians; some 
regarded it as the initial step on the path of revision until as late as 1938. István Bethlen 
and Pál Teleki were the two Hungarian politicians who definitely tried to implement ethnic 
revision in Czechoslovakia.11
After the First World War, Hungarian leaders hoped that the Slovak elite would eventually 
adopt a pro-Hungarian attitude and Slovakia would join Hungary. Although there were at-
tempts to realise this plan, it could not be considered a practicable solution in the second 
half of the 1930s. Hungarian diplomacy did everything to win over Andrej Hlinka12 and his 
party to their cause. Their attempts were frustrated by the Vojtech Tuka trial,13 in which 
they lost the man who could have influenced Hlinka and Tiso.14 Vojtech Tuka thought at 
first that Slovakia should unite with Hungary but he changed his mind during the years of 
his imprisonment, and he let a Hungarian agent know about it in 193915. The Hungarian 
government tried other ways as well: Jehlička and Dvorčák tried to gain Slovak politicians 
through the organisations that they founded and through other Slovak emigrants. These 
movements did not have significant influence on the Slovak population; their movements 
lost their social base after initial successes in the 1920s. Still, the Hungarian administration 
expected them to establish cooperation with the Slovak People’s Party led by Andrej Hlin-
10   On the inner situation of the Hungarian population in Slovakia see: Attila SIMON, A szlovákiai magyar 
politika és Dél-Szlovákia a két világháború közötti kolonizációja, in: Integrációs stratégiák a magyar kisebbségek 
történetében, Attila SIMON – Nádor BÁRDI (eds.), Somorja 2006, 261–276; Béla ANGYAL, Érdekvédelem és 
önszerveződés, Galánta – Dunaszerdahely 2002.
11  Jörg K. HOENSCH, Die Slowakei und Hitlers Ostpolitik, Köln – Graz 1965, 63.
12  Andrej Hlinka (1864–1938), Slovak politician, Catholic priest. He started his political career in the Catholic 
People’s Party, later joined the Slovak National Party and became the leader of its clerical wing. From 1905 
the founding president of the Slovak People’s Party. Member of Parliament. In 1919, he asked the Paris Peace 
Conference in a note to grant autonomy for Slovakia within Czechoslovakia, and therefore the Czech authorities 
deprived him of his seat in parliament and imprisoned him for eight months. Later he became the leading figure 
of the Slovak autonomy movement against the Czech centralising attempts. His successor and the new leader of 
the movement was Jozef Tiso.
13  Vojtech Tuka (1880–1946), lawyer, university professor, politician. He taught at the academy of law in Pécs and 
later at the University of Bratislava. He took part in the Hungarian secret military organisation and the establish-
ment of the Hungarian political parties in Czechoslovakia. He joined Hlinka’s Slovak People’s Party, in which he 
became deputy president and, from 1925, the representative of the party in the parliament. He drafted the first 
autonomy plan of the party. In 1929, the Czechoslovak authorities arrested him as a Hungarian spy and sentenced 
him for 15 years in prison. He was released by amnesty in 1937. In the Tiso government, he was deputy minister, 
Foreign Minister and Prime Minister. He was executed as a war criminal in 1946.
14  The Slovak-Hungarian cooperation was hampered by the Tuka trial, which revealed, even though no evidence 
was shown, that Tuka had received money and commission from the Hungarian government for spying. See: 
Tímea VERES, A Tuka-per közvetlen előzményei a cseh és szlovák sajtóban, in: Fórum-Társadalomtudományi 
Szemle 6, 2004, 1, 149–153; Tímea VERES, Tuka politikai visszatérése, in: Fórum-Társadalomtudományi Szemle 9, 
2007, 2, 87–100; Michal LUKEŠ, Cesta k amnestii Vojtecha Tuky, Historický časopis 46, 1998, 4, 663–672.
15  Tuka said in the first half of 1939 that he could do nothing to facilitate the annexation of Slovakia by Hungary. 
Then the Hungarian diplomacy wrote him off as an agent. Juraj FABIAN, Svätoštefanské tiene Telekiho zahraničná 
politika a Slovensko 1939–41, Bratislava, 1966, 31, 91.
30 Hungarian Attempts at the Annexationof Slovakia in 1938 (Part I)István JANEK
ka. Hlinka and his circle, however, rejected cooperation with Jehlička and Dvorčák from 
the second half of the 1920s. Direct approaches of the Hungarian government had no 
perceptible result, either. 
The alternative for Hungary after the Anschluss was either to come to some agreement 
with the Little Entente and give up the idea of revision, or to participate in the German 
actions against Czechoslovakia. Although Hungarian politicians saw the growth of German 
power with anxiety, non-interference in the dissolution of the Czechoslovak Republic was 
out of the question from foreign and domestic aspects alike. The Hungarians understood 
that they had to negotiate with the leadership of the Slovak People’s Party, Hlinka and 
Jozef Tiso if they wanted to get Slovakia.16 
Hungarian diplomacy realised that Poland needed a common Hungarian-Polish border due 
to the growing threat from Germany. The fall of Czechoslovakia might end in the German 
occupation of the whole country. Polish and Hungarian politicians regarded this option as 
a fatal consequence, which is to be prevented at any rate. Therefore, Warsaw observed 
the national movements in Czechoslovakia, among them the breakaway attempts of the 
Slovaks, with content and supported them. The Polish government always supported the 
Hungarian side in the Czechoslovak-Hungarian conflicts. 
Hungarian-Polish attempts to approach Slovak leaders
From March 1938, Hungarian diplomacy sought the opportunity to start negotiations with 
Slovak leaders. As Czechoslovakia still existed at that time, talks had to be held in secret, 
and they required a mediating party. They made use of the fact that the Poles had talks 
with Slovak leaders at the beginning of 1938. The Polish foreign minister, Józef Beck sent 
the message to Hungary17 that they could make progress in the Slovakian question only 
if they built honest connections with the leaders of the Slovak People’s Party and Karol 
Sidor.18 The Hungarian ambassador to Prague, János Wettstein asked for the opinion of the 
Hungarian Foreign Ministry in his letter of 2 March. The response of the ministry (7 March) 
pointed out that Hungary would grant autonomy not only to the Slovaks but also to the Ru-
thenians if they return to Hungary. The degree of autonomy would depend on the circum-
stances of their return. If the Slovaks cooperated in the breakup of Czechoslovakia, they 
would receive greater autonomy; otherwise they could expect limited autonomy. The letter 
also mentioned that other friendly states would participate in a military action19 (Poland 
and Germany were implied although not named). Polish activity raised Hungarian worries: 
perhaps the Poles also had territorial claims in Slovakia, which had hitherto been regarded 
16  Magda ÁDÁM, A müncheni egyezmény létrejötte és Magyarország külpolitikája 1936–1938, Budapest 1965. 
Diplomácia iratok Magyarország külpolitikájához 1936–1945, II (hereinafter referred only as DIMK, II), 369–370 
(doc. no. 187).
17  Ibidem, 339–340 (doc. no. 160).
18  Karol Sidor (1901–1953), Slovak politician and journalist. The rival of Jozef Tiso in the Hlinka party and politics 
in general. Member of the National Assembly from 1935. From 1 December 1938, deputy Prime Minister in the 
Prague government. In March 1939, the last Prime Minister of the Slovak government in Czechoslovakia. From 
1939–1945, the ambassador of Slovakia to the Vatican. He emigrated to Canada after 1945.
19  KRAMMER, 290.
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as a purely Hungarian sphere of interest. This seemed to be justified by the fact that news 
started to spread in the Polish press and the public about a possible Polish annexation of 
Slovakia. The Poles expressed that they did not want the territory; the only purpose of this 
news was to facilitate the inner disintegration of Czechoslovakia.20 The Polish general staff 
also enquired about the Hungarian plans. They wanted to know where the Hungarians 
wanted to draw the border of Hungary and of the Slovak autonomous territory as well as 
the Hungarian intentions concerning the Carpathian region.21 The Hungarian diplomacy 
informed the Poles in a letter sent by Foreign Minister Kálmán Kánya on 15 May 1938 that 
they claimed only Slovakia and the Carpathian region but not the little pieces that were 
ceded to Poland after the First World War.22 This seemed to settle the territorial disputes 
between the two countries by and large although some uncertainty remained sensible. 
In mid-May 1938, Hungarian diplomacy asked the Poles for mediation with Slovakia. The 
Polish Foreign Minister, Józef Beck met with Karol Sidor in Warsaw on 19 May and told him 
that if Czechoslovakia fell apart, Hungary had to annex Slovakia. Beck also pointed out to 
the Hungarian ambassador in Warsaw, András Hory, that the Slovak leaders were distrustful 
towards Budapest, and therefore the Hungarian diplomacy should approach Slovak lead-
ers as soon as possible. The Poles made it clear that they wanted to assure the Slovaks that 
they had no claims for Slovakia. They said, that “[…] they did the utmost effort to secure 
tranquillity in the region, which is possible only if Budapest satisfies the demands of the 
Slovaks, who are awakened to an independent nationhood, for self-government”.23
The Hungarians wanted to find out about the Polish plans, and they sent Colonel Rezső 
Andorka, a leader of the intelligence department of the Hungarian General Staff to collect 
information at the end of June 1938. Andorka had talks with the Head of Staff of the Polish 
army, General Wacław Stachiewicz, in which he wanted to know if the Hungarians could 
count on Polish military intervention against Czechoslovakia in case of a German attack, 
and if so, with what strategic objectives. Stachievicz did not give a clear answer; he merely 
said that they would act as their national interests demand. He mentioned though, that 
the Poles designated two different zones in Slovakia: the Carpathian region, which was 
important only as much as the most appropriate place for the common Polish-Hungarian 
border but the Poles had no further interest in the area. The other zone was the Slovakian 
populated territories. Here, Stachevicz said, also the wishes of the Slovak nation must be 
considered as a prerequisite of long-lasting or final settlement. Andorka had the impres-
sion that the Poles might have some special agreement with the Slovaks, whose details 
remained unknown.
Andorka also led talks with Tadeusz Kobylański, the head of the political department of the 
Polish Foreign Ministry and asked him about the Polish territorial demands. Kobylański let 
20  DIMK, II, 369 (doc. no. 187).
21  The question of the Carpathian region was important for the Poles due to the Ukrainian movement, which had 
been being organised. The Poles were afraid that a Ukrainian movement in the Sub-Carpathian area could lead 
to the formation of a Ukrainian Piedmont, and from there the significant number of Ukrainians in Poland could be 
organised into a revolt. To avoid this, they would welcome Hungarian control over this territory.
22  DIMK, II, 383 (doc. no. 200).
23  Ibidem, 246 (doc. no. 447).
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him know that they formed claims for Teschen24 and a few Polish villages in Orava25 and the 
Spiš26. He emphasised that Polish diplomacy endeavours to get the Slovaks to accept the 
Hungarian version. He asked the Hungarians that in case of, or even before, a referendum 
in Czechoslovakia, to do effort to attract the Slovaks with propaganda.27 Now, Andorka 
thought that the Poles were open to cooperation with Hungary but he did not exclude that 
they had some hidden intentions with Slovakia and could have larger territorial demands.28 
These worries proved ill-founded later.
János Esterházy, the leader of the Hungarians in Slovakia, also got involved in the Pol-
ish-Hungarian talks.29 He maintained good connections with high-rank Slovak and Polish 
politicians, and therefore he played an important role as a mediator. He wanted to create 
a Catholic Polish-Slovak-Hungarian bloc in Central Europe, which could, in his view, resist 
German advance more effectively. Esterházy wanted to know to what extent the Poles 
would support Hungarian plans with Slovakia.
Karol Sidor represented the Polish orientation in the Slovak People’s Party, so he was the 
first for Esterházy to contact. Esterházy assured Sidor that Hungary did not intend to deploy 
military force against Slovakia but wanted to hold talks with Poland about the creation of a 
common border between Poland and Hungary in the Carpathian region.30 Later Esterházy 
also protected the interests of the Slovaks at the Hungarian government by emphasising 
that he would be willing to mediate between Hungary and Slovakia only if the Hungarian 
government did not repeat its former mistakes and did not want to abuse the Slovaks. He 
found the annexation feasible only in agreement with the wish of the Slovak people and he 
rejected the use of force in any way. Esterházy suggested that the Hungarian government 
should grant the Slovaks as many minority rights in the would-be Slovak constitution as 
possible but certainly more than the Czechs had given before.31
János Esterházy had talks with Beck and his deputy, the foreign secretary, Count Jan Szem-
bek, about the plans with Slovakia on 17 and 18 July 1938. Beck informed Esterházy that 
the collapse of Czechoslovakia was at hand and it would be the consequence of domestic 
tension rather than foreign pressure. “Hitler wants to avoid war at any rate, and therefore he 
chose the method of inner disintegration, which will be thoroughly done by Konrad Henlein32 
24  In Czech known as Těšínsko.
25  In Hungarian known as Árva.
26  In Hungarian known as Szepesség.
27  Ibidem, 252 (doc. no. 468–470).
28  Ibidem, 470.
29  János Esterházy (1901–1957), politician. He was elected member of the National Assembly in 1935. After the 
unification of the two Hungarian parties in Czechoslovakia, the managing president of the party from July 1936. 
After the First Vienna Award, he remained in Slovakia and became president of the Hungarian Party. In 1942, he 
was the single member of the Slovak parliament to vote against the Jew law. After the war, he was imprisoned in 
Czechoslovak and Soviet prisons until his death.
30  Pavel ČARNOGURSKÝ, 6. 10. 1938, Bratislava 1993, 105.
31  Diariusz i Teki Jana Szembeka (1935–1945), Jozef ZARONSKI (ed.), Vol. IV, London 1972, 189, 192.
32  Konrad Henlein (1898–1945), Sudeten German politician. He established the Sudeten German Patriotic Front 
movement in 1931; it was organised as a party in 1935. With the support of Hitler’s Germany, he caused a do-
mestic political crisis and, with the increase of the Sudeten German national demands, he helped the minority 
question in Czechoslovakia to mushroom into a European problem.
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and his fellows.”33 In Beck’s opinion, if Czechoslovakia falls apart, the whole of Slovakia 
will have to be returned to Hungary. Beck spoke about this to Karol Sidor as well, whom 
he assured that they would receive wide autonomy from the Hungarians. Sidor responded 
that they were not afraid of the Hungarian population in Slovakia, as they understood each 
other, but they were worried about the behaviour of the Hungarians in Hungary. Esterházy 
explained to the Polish leaders as well as to Sidor that the Hungarians did not want to 
repeat their former mistakes, and the annexed Slovakia would possibly not be governed 
from Budapest but local authorities would receive significant power. He gave the example 
of Croatia in the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy with its autonomous position. He had the 
view that the Slovaks would be granted a high degree of domestic and foreign autonomy 
with their own parliament and extended power. Only foreign, financial and economic affairs 
would be handled together. As for territorial questions, only the Carpathian region and 
the parts of Slovakia with Hungarian majority would be annexed by Hungary. Esterházy 
also raised a new point: Poland could guarantee the observance of the Slovak constitution 
promised by the Hungarian government.34
Beck, in his endeavour to facilitate the Hungarian-Slovak approach, also offered to Sidor, 
and the other Slovak leaders through him, that they could negotiate in Warsaw rather than 
Budapest, should they be worried about the Czechs35. Neither the Poles nor Esterházy 
managed to get Sidor to support the Hungarian proposal; the politician fiercely attacked 
the Hungarians in ‘Slovák’, the Bratislava daily in its issue of 31 July. Sidor found it ridic-
ulous that Hlinka and the Slovaks would want to join Hungary or any other country. He 
emphasised that the Slovaks “do not want the Hungarians, they do not believe them and 
the return to Hungary is out of the question. […] As we survived the age of the Romans, 
the Huns, the Hungarians and other, so shall we live and hold out”.36 Sidor also pointed 
out in his article that only the Czechs and the Jews were satisfied with their situation in 
Czechoslovakia. The Slovaks did not want to form a Czecho-Slovak nation, only a Slovak. 
He protested in the article that the Slovaks were not even acknowledged as a nation in his 
country. The Hungarian diplomacy took Sidor’s words seriously and they thought they had 
better continue the talks with Josef Tiso.
Hungarian-Slovak unification talks in 1938
In the second half of 1938, Slovak politicians made plans with new elements regarding the 
form of government in Slovakia for the case if Czechoslovakia should fall apart or should be 
occupied. These political combinations were based on the idea that the year 1938 would 
have as great impact on European affairs as 1918 had had, that is, significant territorial 
changes could be expected in the region. They counted on the unification with a neigh-
bouring country in order to avoid the destruction of the Slovak nation. They imagined the 
33  DIMK, II, 457 (doc. no. 250).
34  ZARONSKI, IV., 189–190, 194.
35  DIMK, II, 457 (doc. no. 250).
36  Magyar Nemzeti Levéltár Országos Levéltára (The State Archives of the Hungarian National Archives; hereinaf-
ter referred only as MNL–OL), Foreign Ministry (hereinafter referred to only as KÜM), K 63, 64. csomó (hereinafter 
referred to only as “cs.”), doc. no. 2541/pol. 1838.
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unification by forming a federation or union. Andrej Hlinka mentioned it to a Polish diplo-
mat, as early as April 1938, that they would possibly break with the Czechs and that they 
were ready to cooperate with the Poles. Tiso and others wanted to achieve that the Poles 
support the recognition of the Slovaks as a political nation or possibly their autonomy or 
even their independence. They even mentioned the formation of a Polish-Slovak union but 
this idea did not receive serious attention.37
The Slovak politicians also held talks with the Hungarians. Hungarian diplomacy welcomed 
the news that Andrej Hlinka said to his followers in his political testament on his death 
bed in August 1938: “As soon as there is time and opportunity to break away from the 
Czechs, I leave it to Karol Sidor, who is the most competent representative of the will of 
the nation and myself, to negotiate with the Hungarian government about the Slovaks’ 
unification with Hungary bearing in mind the conditions of autonomy, which result from the 
programme of our party.”38 No documents have remained about the talks between Hlinka 
and the Hungarian government so the political testament cannot be proven.
Hungarian diplomacy realised as early as the beginning of 1938 that Hlinka’s most powerful 
man, and his possible successor, would be Jozef Tiso, and therefore they were trying to 
come to an agreement with him in the question of Slovakia. The secret talks took place at 
the 34th Eucharistic World Congress in Budapest at the end of May 1938.39 Tiso, the new 
president of the Slovak People’s Party, was a participant priest, so he could meet with the 
Hungarian Foreign Minister, Kálmán Kánya without attracting attention. Tiso said that the 
Slovaks were willing to establish a common state with Hungary after their secession from 
the Czechs. Their talks continued until the end of September 1938.40 Tiso summarised his 
conditions in three points: “1. Central office with executive power for the administration of 
Slovakia and the use of Slovak as official language; 2. A separate parliament as legislative 
power for domestic affairs, religion and public education; 3. Budget quota.”41 The Poles 
also found out about the Slovak-Hungarian talks, and the Hungarians responded that “[…] 
no final decision has been made yet but the negotiations are going in a favourable atmo-
sphere”.42 Tiso visited Edvard Beneš in Prague on 23 September 1938, of which he informed 
the Hungarian government. With his trip, he wanted to prevent the Slovak leadership from 
splitting into factions, and to refute the charge that he did not take every opportunity to 
reach an agreement. He asked, therefore, the Hungarian government not to interpret his 
visit to Prague as delaying tactics, but “they have to show a friendly face towards Prague, 
otherwise they are in danger of being slaughtered”.43 He also asked the Hungarian leaders 
not to flood Slovakia with Hungarian officials after the unification as they were not familiar 
with the local circumstances and they could soon elicit resentment in the Slovak population. 
37   Poland gave the Slovaks no answer regarding the union. See: Pavel ČARNOGURSKÝ, Deklarácia o únii 
Slovenska s Poľskem z 28. októbra 1938, in: Historický časopis 16, 1968, 3, 416.
38  Naša Zastava, 4. 2. 1940, 3.
39  MNL–OL, K 63, 63 cs., doc. no. 1938, 7/1.
40  DIMK, II, 665–666 (doc. no. 403).
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Although the Hungarian government accepted Tiso’s conditions, the Slovak-Hungarian ne-
gotiations ended without success. In the opinion of Ambassador András Hory, they could 
not come to an agreement because Kánya did not trust Tiso.44 Kálmán Kánya said these 
words about the intentions of the Slovak politicians: “the Slovaks, it seems, continue their 
double game. While Sidor makes apparently pro-Czech statements, Tiso have summarised 
his wishes for the case of their unification with Hungary in three points in the past days.”45 
Ferdinand Ďurčanský,46 later Slovak Foreign Minister, described the Slovak opinion about 
the Hungarians like this: “[…] the Slovaks were afraid that their attempt to gain autonomy 
would be interpreted by the Hungarians as the return of the Slovaks to Hungary. What has 
been written down or said in connection with the cooperation with the Hungarians can be 
regarded as a means to put pressure on the Czechoslovak policy.”47 To put it clearly: they 
considered it as a tactical step and rejected the idea of unification. The Hungarian-Slovak 
talks ended without success; still, they continued in secret.48
Hungarian-German-Polish negotiations about the future of Slovakia 
A Hungarian delegation travelled to Germany led by the Regent Miklós Horthy on 21 
August 1938. The bilateral talks took place in an unfriendly atmosphere because the rep-
resentatives of the Hungarian government had made a contract with the representatives 
of the Little Entente in Bled, Slovenia, on 20 August, in which the latter acknowledged 
equal rights for Hungarian rearmament.49 Simultaneously, the Hungarian delegation signed 
contracts with Romania and Yugoslavia about a more effective realisation of the rights of 
Hungarian minorities in the two countries. Hitler resented these Hungarian steps. The Bled 
agreement disguised the Hungarian intention to break the unity of the Little Entente in 
some way. It was the continuation of the old Hungarian policy which by no means aimed 
at reconciliation with the Little Entente. In their view, this was the most important precon-
dition to any further steps. The Germans did not, or would not, understand the Hungarian 
intentions. Therefore the talks in Kiel started in an uneasy atmosphere. The German For-
eign Minister, Ribbentrop explained to Kánya that Hungary had made the realisation of 
her revisionist demands against Czechoslovakia impossible with the agreement.50 Kánya 
endeavoured to belittle the Bled talks. The Hungarian-German negotiations became re-
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ally tense when the Germans asked for Hungary’s military participation in the operations 
against Czechoslovakia, and they expected prompt agreement. They adhered to the mili-
tary solution as the only practicable one; they did not consider that any international talks 
could bring success in this question. Horthy assured the Germans about Hungarian coop-
eration but only on certain conditions. The Hungarians did not think the German military 
action properly timed. Kánya also expressed to Ribbentrop that the armament of Hungary 
was only in an initial stage, and they could not risk war against the well-equipped Czech 
army. Kánya also said to Göring a few days later that if there had been 60–70% chance for 
success against the Czechs, they would take the risk, but the Germans could not expect 
Hungary to commit suicide.51 He rejected participation in military action by referring to 
the weakness of the army; the question of Hungarian military participation could not have 
come into serious consideration anyway.52 Ribbentrop asked Kánya pointedly about the 
Hungarian viewpoint in case of a possible German-Czech military conflict. Kánya respond-
ed by emphasising the neutrality of Hungary.53 The German leaders offered to acknowl-
edge Hungarian claims for the whole of Slovakia, including the Carpathian region in case 
of Hungary’s participation.54 The Hungarians rejected this idea. Horthy said to Hitler that 
Hungary would not force revision with arms. The Führer told the Hungarian delegation that 
“however, who wants to sit at the table, must at least help with the cooking”.55
The Hungarian government, fearing a western intervention, rejected Hitler’s demands,56 
that is, the Kiel talks failed to bring any success. However, the Hungarians tried to keep the 
German alliance alive, and therefore they gave some economic concessions. They were 
afraid that their attack on Czechoslovakia would turn the Little Entente as well as England 
and France against them, and a military conflict like that could end only with the defeat 
of Hungary. They wanted to satisfy their territorial demands in a peaceful way. Hungarian 
politicians counted on a long preparatory period, and they were not prepared for a mili-
tary action against Czechoslovakia. They wanted to isolate Czechoslovakia with the Bled 
agreement but the events got further, and now they had to think about whether or not they 
should participate in an invasion planned by Germany.
In mid-September 1938, disturbances began in the Sudetenland in Czechoslovakia, backed 
by the German intelligence. Representatives of the Sudeten Germans contacted János Es-
terházy and called the Hungarians to join their movement. They said it could bring about 
the revision of the Trianon Treaty. Esterházy rejected cooperation and said: “The Hungarian 
Party does not join the struggle of the Sudeten Germans, which can initiate a new world 
war. The incidents provoked by you will be bloodily revenged by the Czechoslovak army. 
If the Hungarians joined the Sudeten initiative, Hitler would declare himself our protector 
as well and could use it as a pretext to attack Czechoslovakia. In this way, we would be 
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the cause of the outbreak of the war. We do not want it by any means. We do not want to 
enforce the revision of the Trianon Treaty with a war.”57 Esterházy also expressed, on behalf 
of his party, that the Hungarians imagine revision in a peaceful and democratic way. The 
Sudeten Germans responded that “You are a pacifist, Mr Esterházy! Through your pacifist 
attempts you will never achieve the revision wanted by the Hungarian minority”.58 Ester-
házy wrote in response that the Hungarian minority and the state of Hungary would benefit 
more from giving up revision than from enforcing it through a second world war. About the 
unification of Slovakia and Hungary, Esterházy explained that he could only imagine it with-
out violence and with the consent of the Slovak people. In his view, the unification would 
take place on a dualist model, just like the connection between Croatia and Hungary in 
the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, with separate government, parliament, budget and with 
an army subordinate to the Hungarian government.59 Esterházy did not stand alone with 
his attempt for peaceful revision. It occurred to several Hungarian politicians that the price 
for German orientation and revision could be too high. Pál Teleki expressed his worries in 
confidential circles: “We will perish with the revision; it will involve us in war. We get back 
Upper Hungary, all right, also Ruthenian; these we can deal with, adopt, administer. […] 
If Transylvania returns, we will be obliged to the Germans forever, who will then demand 
the price. And the price will be war on their side; the country herself will be the price of 
revision.”60 Esterházy soon realised the dangers of forceful revision, that is also why he sup-
ported agreement with the Slovaks in future, and he was not happy about the involvement 
of the great powers, which, he thought, would use this issue to their own purposes.
Göring called the Hungarian ambassador in Berlin, Döme Sztójay to him on 17 September 
1938, and said to him that “here is the decisive moment”61 to demand the rights of the 
Hungarian minority. He asked the Hungarians to issue a proclamation similar to the call of 
Konrad Henlein as well as the provocation of armed clashes. He saw this to be the only 
way to direct the attention of the great powers to the Hungarian claims. The purpose of 
the Germans was to show the inviability of the Czechoslovak state. The only thing the Hun-
garian politicians did was to set up the Ragged Guard (Rongyos Gárda) in secret, with the 
organisation of the former Minister of the Interior, Miklós Kozma. This group was to be de-
ployed in the Carpathian region for sabotage actions and to organise a general rebellion.62
The United Hungarian Party sent a proclamation to the Czechoslovak government on 17 
September 1938, in which they called for self-determination and right for a referendum 
for the Hungarian population in Czechoslovakia. The Hungarians thought that the Slovaks 
would take a similar step. A Slovak demand for referendum, and consequently the unifica-
tion with Hungary would have served the interest of the Hungarian revision. However, the 
supporters of Slovak autonomy did not want unification with Hungary.
The Polish government asked the Hungarian government again for information about the 
57  Lujza ESTERHÁZY, Szívek az ár ellen, Budapest 1991, 86.
58  Ibidem.
59  Imre MOLNÁR, Sem gyűlölettel, sem erőszakkal. Esterházy János élete és mártírhalála, Komárom 2008, 72.
60  Miklós ZEIDLER, Mozgástér a kényszerpályán. A magyar külpolitika „választásai” a két háború között, in: 
Romsics Ignác szerk: Mítoszok, tévhitek, hiedelmek a 20. századi magyar történelemről, Budapest 2002, 193.
61  DIMK II, 619 (doc. no. 361).
62  Mária ORMOS, Egy magyar médiavezér: Kozma Miklós. II., Budapest 2000, 552–563.
38 Hungarian Attempts at the Annexationof Slovakia in 1938 (Part I)István JANEK
Hungarian-Slovak talks. Their exaggerated interest concerning Slovakia raised the suspi-
cion of the Hungarians again about Polish territorial claims. Therefore they sent Rezső 
Andorka to Warsaw once again to meet with military leaders. He talked with the Head of 
Staff, Wacław Stachiewicz, just as before. The Polish general explained that the Poles had 
no interest in former Upper Hungary but he added: unless the Slovaks asked for their as-
sistance. However, he declared clearly that they wanted no territory from the Carpathian 
region, as they had enough problems with their own Ukrainians. Andorka said that the Hun-
garian government could explain some modification of the borders in favour of Poland. 
Stachiewicz responded that the Slovaks must not be divided or dismembered; Slovakia 
must remain in one piece wherever she should get. Andorka clearly asked that if Hungarian 
troops had marched in Upper Hungary, where could they meet Polish troops, or if Poland 
considered a joint Polish-Hungarian military operation possible for the invasion of Upper 
Hungary. Stachiewicz rejected this idea and added that they did not want to send troops to 
Upper Hungary. Andorka’s endeavour to bring together military cooperation fell through.63
Hungarian diplomacy was hoping to come to some agreement with the Slovaks. This is 
mirrored in the letter of Foreign Minister Kálmán Kánya to the Hungarian ambassador in 
Warsaw, András Hory, in which he writes about the Slovak leaders: “We share the view that 
the Slovaks play a half-hearted double game, but we hope that the forthcoming events 
will make them come to a firmer standpoint.”64 In his cipher telegram of 19 September 
1938, Kánya informs Hory about the talks with the Slovaks: “[…] the present leaders of the 
Slovaks cannot make a clear decision despite the fact that we have offered them extended 
autonomy.”65 Kánya asked Hory to inform the Poles that if Czechoslovakia starts to disinte-
grate from within, they demand a referendum only in the Hungarian-populated territories, 
but in this case they would support the secession of the Slovaks and the Carpathian region 
as well. In Kánya’s views “The Slovaks still maintain the view that they receive considerable 
autonomy in the Czech state and they grant the Hungarians similar rights.”66 Kánya asked 
the Poles to try to make the Slovaks understand that “the Czech state is doomed to die”, 
and therefore it would be important that they unite with Hungary in case of a possible 
referendum.
The Poles suggested that they should talk over the Slovak proposal of autonomy together 
and then they would guarantee its observance. The Hungarian Foreign Minister answered 
in a reserved voice: “The Slovak autonomy guaranteed by Poland is a most problematic 
question, which must be handled very carefully from the viewpoint of the sovereignty of 
Hungary and the development of a friendly Polish-Hungarian relationship.”67 Kánya only 
promised to inform Poland about the progress of the negotiations, and that they would 
accept the Slovak claims for autonomy at any rate. The Hungarian government did not 
succeed in coming to an agreement with the Slovaks until mid-September 1938 in spite of 
the Polish mediating attempts. Hory talked with Beck as well about the Slovak question, 
63  DIMK, II, 589–590 (doc. no. 331).
64  Ibidem, 616 (doc. no. 358).
65  Ibidem, 623 (doc. no. 364).
66  Ibidem.
67  Ibidem.
39CENTRAL EUROPEAN PAPERS 2013 / I / 1
who assured him that they would endeavour to get the Slovaks to turn towards Hungary. 
“He also said that they had no selfish intentions in the Slovak question, and they acted 
only in the interest of Hungary.”68 The Poles informed Hory on 22 September that they had 
given orders to their ambassador in Prague and their consul in Bratislava to warn the Slovak 
autonomist politicians that they had to decide on their union with Hungary, as the Hungar-
ian-populated territories would be cut off, which would cause serious economic difficulties 
for Slovakia.69 The notion was shared both in Warsaw and in Budapest that thanks to the 
ever deteriorating minority situation and foreign pressure, there would be no other option 
for the Slovaks but to join Hungary.
On 20 September, Hitler met with Hungarian Prime Minister, Béla Imrédy and Foreign Min-
ister Kánya in Obersalzberg. He said that the appropriate moment had come for Hungary 
to attack Czechoslovakia while he was talking with the British Prime Minister Neville Cham-
berlain. Hitler here repeated his offer for the division of Czechoslovakia. The Hungarian 
politicians gave an evasive answer because they did not want to start war.70
The Hungarian government did not give up the struggle for Slovakia: they dispatched the 
former emigrant Slovaks, Jehlička and Dvorčák. Both asked, on behalf of the Slovak Na-
tional Council, that the Slovak question would be discussed at the conference of the great 
powers. At the meeting of Godesberg on 22–23 October 1938, they asked the German 
and English delegation to tackle the Slovak question as well and support the initiatives for 
a referendum.
Jehlička had already drafted a memorandum for the Hungarian government in Geneva a 
month before on 21 September 1938. He pointed out the importance of granting self-de-
termination to the Slovaks, that is, they should be allowed to decide where they wanted 
to belong. Therefore he asked the Hungarian, the German and the Italian governments to 
acknowledge the Slovak Council the legal representative of the Slovaks. In Jehlička’s view, 
all the Slovaks should return to Hungary with extended autonomy. Otherwise they would 
be exposed to the interests of the Czechs. He mentioned this as a danger: “The Czech 
population would flow to Slovakia from the territories to be annexed, and they would 
devour Slovakia and turn it to Czech territory.”71 Jehlička said that the Slovak people had 
never wanted to secede from Hungary and it was their only desire to return to their old 
home, under the crown of St Stephen. Moreover, he asked for the diplomatic and military 
help of the Hungarian government.72 He advised the Hungarians to turn to the Germans, 
the Italians and the Poles for help. About the Poles he added that it should be asked only 
in case the Germans and the Italians do not help. Since there were a few among the Slo-
vaks who would orientate themselves to Poland, Jehlička thought it possible that the Poles 
bring territorial claims in return for their help, which Hungary would be incapable of satisfy-
ing. Hungary had a thousand-year historical right to have the whole of Slovakia, which they 
must not give up. Jehlička, in order to confirm his own position, showed himself as the one 
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who is to complete the political testament of Hlinka and to continue his policy.73 The efforts 
of Jehlička and Dvorčák were not taken seriously by the western powers. The Germans and 
the Italians, however, to support the Hungarians, regarded them as negotiating partners 
and held unofficial talks with them. Jehlička was even received by Benito Mussolini.
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